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Experimental Strategies for Regulating Fintech
Hilary J. Allen1
Faced with new technologies that confound existing financial regulatory
structures, regulators around the world have been experimenting with new
approaches to regulating fintech. The most prominent of these experiments
have been innovator-focused programs that provide guidance (and in the case
of regulatory sandboxes, regulatory relief) to private sector firms, in order to
help them navigate a confusing thicket of financial regulation that might
otherwise impede their innovation. These innovator-focused programs can
improve efficiency and competition in the provision of financial services, but
can – at best – only make incidental contributions to the financial regulatory
goals of consumer and investor protection, and the promotion of financial
stability. This Essay argues that when regulatory resources are scarce, the
priority should be experimentation by the regulators in order to advance these
core financial regulatory goals of protecting investors, consumers and the
financial system. This Essay therefore surveys recent technological
experimentation by financial regulators (known as “SupTech”), and
concludes that while the experimentation to date has been valuable and may
improve the execution of longstanding financial regulatory functions, further
experimentation is needed to address the new problems and risks created by
the rise of fintech technologies.
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I. INTRODUCTION
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Our current financial regulatory system is struggling to deal with the
rise of fintech, and this Essay examines the experimental governmental
programs that are being trialed in response. From innovation hubs to
regulatory sandboxes to specialty charters, recent efforts by governments and
regulatory authorities to promote fintech innovation and competition have
been in the spotlight. However, the technological advances afoot in the
financial industry also impact the core financial regulatory goals of protecting
consumers, investors and financial stability. This Essay argues for increased
experimentation by financial regulators with their own technological
solutions (a phenomenon known as “SupTech”), not only to improve their
capacity to discharge their existing regulatory functions, but also to address
new vulnerabilities created by the fintech business models that use
technologies like machine learning and smart contracts to deliver financial
services in new ways.
All regulators, not just financial regulators, struggle when confronted
with new innovations.2 Under-resourced regulators can find it challenging to
keep pace with a nimbler private sector that often seeks to exploit loopholes
in regulations drafted long before the innovation was even dreamt of. The
fear of unintended consequences looms large over any steps that regulators
do take to regulate the innovation. Regulators must also address new
innovations in accordance with their statutory mandates, which are often
multiple and may conflict. This Essay uses three innovative business models
– marketplace lending, robo-investing, and smart contract swaps – as case
studies to illustrate some of the new challenges facing four financial
regulatory agencies: the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”),
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”), Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) and Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(“CFTC”).
Each of these agencies is currently experimenting with different forms
of regulation for fintech, but the most visible of these are designed to
encourage innovation by the private sector.3 Private sector fintech innovation
can further regulatory goals of promoting market efficiency and competition
in the interests of consumers. However, the private sector cannot be relied
upon to protect investors or consumers from predatory practices, or to ensure
the ongoing stability of the financial system. This Essay argues that the
priority should therefore be technological experimentation by the regulators
themselves in order to further these core regulatory goals. It therefore surveys
the current (nascent) state of “SupTech” innovation, and explores many of the
challenges it faces. In many respects, these are the perennial challenges of
limited resources, opportunities for arbitrage and fear of unintended
consequences, that animate all debates about regulating innovation.
2

For an excellent discussion of the challenges regulators face in regulating new
innovations, see Tim Wu, Agency Threats, 60 DUKE L. J. 1841 (2011).
3
See Section III infra.
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Notwithstanding these challenges, however, this Essay urges as much
SupTech experimentation as is presently possible. The SupTech innovations
advocated for in this article (including circuit breakers for smart contracts and
hypothetical data sets for machine learning algorithms) are things that must
be “plugged in” to private sector products in order to be effective. Such
regulatory strategies will be most effective if developed while the private
sector technology is still in its infancy and therefore more malleable – time is
therefore of the essence for SupTech experimentation.
The rest of this Essay will proceed as follows. Section II will briefly
engage with the administrative law literature on regulating innovation in
general, before using case studies from the financial industry to illustrate
some of the particular problems facing the OCC, CFPB, SEC and CFTC.
Section III surveys the most high-profile regulatory experiments conducted
by these and other agencies in light of the rise of fintech, and makes clear that
these high-profile programs and policies are all designed to encourage private
sector innovation. Section III then explores why encouraging private sector
innovation will not address the core financial regulatory mandates of
consumer/investor protection and financial stability; Section IV therefore
makes the case for SupTech innovation by the regulatory agencies themselves
to advance their core mandates. After Section IV considers the challenges
facing SupTech innovation, Section V concludes.
II. THE CHALLENGES OF REGULATING NEW FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGIES
Innovation is the process by which the economy is revitalized with
new types of products and services, as well as new ways of providing existing
products and services.4 However, while often beneficial, innovation is not
always an improvement, and so regulators must remain alert to the new ways
in which products and services are being provided.5 Irrespective of the type
of innovation involved, innovation always poses some basic challenges for
regulators. First, because innovation often allows outcomes to be achieved in
ways that were previously unanticipated, existing regulatory structures often
do not contemplate that innovation – as a result, processes and outcomes that
are desirable might be unintentionally prohibited, whereas processes and
outcomes that are problematic might be permitted by regulatory structures
devised in an earlier time.6 Regulators can seek to update their regulations to
address innovation, but the pace of innovation is typically more rapid than the
slow-moving apparatus of regulatory action.7 Furthermore, if rules are
adopted before the innovation is properly understood, they may become
4
JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 82–83
(1975).
5
Hilary J. Allen, A New Philosophy for Financial Stability Regulation 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.
J. 173, 215-22 (2013).
6
Eric Biber et al., 70 VAND. L. REV. 1561, 1565 (2017).
7
Tim Wu, Agency Threats, 60 DUKE L. J. 1841, 1851 (2011).
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‘sticky’ and hard to change – even if it ultimately becomes clear that they are
poorly suited to the evolved innovation.8 On the other hand, if regulators wait
too long, the market for the innovation can become well established and
regulators may then be loath to intervene for reasons of political economy.9
Regulators are typically under-resourced when compared with the
technical expertise and funding of the private sector, and this disparity
becomes starker when innovation is proceeding very quickly.10 As a result,
regulators become increasingly reliant on the industry for information and
expertise, which can breed regulatory capture (a condition in which regulators
start to take on the worldview of the industry they regulate, as opposed to
prioritizing the interests of the public they are charged to protect).11 This type
of capture is particularly likely to arise when there is no crisis at hand to
motivate the public to call regulators to account.12 In such circumstances,
regulators face few negative consequences for neglecting the public interest,
and an uphill battle in challenging the interests of the industry.
Even when regulatory measures are taken, it is to be expected that
market participants will adjust their behavior in light of those standards.13 If
those adjustments involve executing an activity that would otherwise be
regulated in a way that skirts that regulation, then they are known as
regulatory arbitrage – a perennial thorn in the side of any regulatory regime.14
Two well-worn categories of regulatory arbitrage are jurisdictional and
categorical arbitrage.15 The first exploits differences in the laws of different
jurisdictions; the latter “exploits a legal discrepancy between the treatment of
two types of activity or products that are functionally similar.”16
Technological innovation increases opportunities for a process-oriented
variant of categorical arbitrage: often, innovations are designed to create
functional equivalents to regulated products and services by achieving the
same outcomes by way of underlying processes that were not anticipated by
the regulatory regime.

8

Id. at 1849-50.
Allen, supra Note 5 at 223.
10
Yueh-Ping (Alex) Yang & Cheng-Yun Tsang, RegTech and the New Era of Financial
Regulators: Envisaging More Public-Private Partnership Models of Financial Regulation
21 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 354, 360-1 (2018).
11
Hilary J. Allen, Putting the “Financial Stability” In Financial Stability Oversight
Council, 76 Ohio St. L. J. 1087, 1102 (2015). For a survey on the administrative law
literature on informational and cultural capture, see Jonas Anderson, Court Capture 59 B.C.
L. REV. 1543, 1560-63 (2018).
12
Allen, supra Note 11 at 1102.
13
Lawrence G. Baxter, Adaptive Financial Regulation and RegTech: A Concept Article on
Realistic Protection for Victims of Bank Failures 66 DUKE L. J. 567, 594 (2016).
14
For a discussion of the term “regulatory arbitrage”, see Elizabeth Pollman, Tech,
Regulatory Arbitrage, and Limits 20. EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 567, 571 (2019).
15
Id.
16
Id.
9
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Financial regulators contemplating new fintech innovations suffer
acutely from all of these difficulties. They also have to assess new fintech
innovations in the context of their competing legal mandates. In their book
Principles of Financial Regulation, Armour et al. identify the protection of
consumers (and investors), financial stability, market efficiency, competition,
and preventing financial crime as the primary goals of financial regulation
around the world,17 and many financial regulators need to balance more than
one of these mandates. Doing so further complicates the task of regulating
new innovations. For example, the first financial regulatory agency to adopt
a regulatory sandbox for fintech, the U.K.’s FCA, identified three main
benefits that it hoped to achieve by doing so: “reduced time-to-market at
potentially lower cost”; “better access to finance” (for innovators); and “more
innovative products reaching the market”.18 These benefits are consistent
with its mandate to promote competition in the financial services markets,19
but the FCA also has a mandate to protect consumers,20 and to support the
integrity of the UK’s financial system, including “its soundness, stability and
resilience”.21 The case studies in this Section will demonstrate some
situations in which fintech innovation, while improving competition and
efficiency in the markets, may ultimately conflict with goals of
consumer/investor protection and financial stability.
Unlike the FCA, most US financial regulators do not have a mandate
to promote competition, but the CFPB (which is the only federal regulator in
the US to have adopted a regulatory sandbox thus far) and the CFTC are the
exceptions. The CFPB was created to ensure “that all consumers have access
to markets for consumer financial products and services and that markets for
consumer financial products and services are fair, transparent and
competitive.”22 The CFTC has a mission “to protect market users and the
public from fraud, manipulation, and abusive practices related to the sale of
commodity futures and options and to foster open, competitive, and
financially sound commodity futures and option markets.”23 Both agencies,
then, must seek to balance their competition mandate (which militates for
policies that promote innovation resulting in more firms and products in the
market) with their respective consumer or investor protection mandate. The
CFTC’s mission to pursue financially sound markets could also be interpreted
as a direction to pursue financial stability; conflicts therefore abound in these
agencies’ mandates.

17

John Armour et al, PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION, 61-69 (2016).
FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., REGULATORY SANDBOX, 5 (Nov. 2015), https://
www.fca.org.uk/publication/research/regulatory-sandbox.pdf
19
Financial Services Act 2012 (UK), Section 1E.
20
Financial Services Act 2012 (UK), Section 1C.
21
Financial Services Act 2012 (UK), Section 1D.
22
Dodd-Frank Section 1021(a).
23
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, About the CFTC (available at
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/anr/anrabout99.htm).
18
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For the US regulators who do not have statutory mandates to promote
competition, policies to promote innovation must be tied to other parts of the
missions of these agencies – most obviously, a market efficiency function.
For example, the SEC has a mandate to promote efficient markets and capital
formation24 that could be invoked as the basis for efforts to promote
innovation. However, the SEC also has a potentially conflicting investor
protection mandate that could complicate its efforts to promote fintech
innovation (and, as I have explored in previous work, the SEC arguably has a
financial stability mandate as well).25 The OCC has no statutory mandate to
pursue competition or innovation; instead it is charged with “assuring the
safety and soundness of, and compliance with laws and regulations, fair
access to financial services, and fair treatment of customers” by national
banks.26 However, the OCC has committed to supporting “responsible
innovation” by national banks, and justifies such support by recognizing that
the banking system must innovate in order to “remain relevant and vibrant
and to meet the evolving needs of the consumers, businesses, and
communities it serves”.27 The OCC is well aware, however, that it must
approach such innovation with a view to protecting consumers and
maintaining the stability of the banking system.28
Regulators contemplating new fintech innovations thus face many
challenges. The remainder of this Section aims to make this discussion less
abstract by discussing some concrete examples of fintech innovations that
confound existing regulatory structures. I have chosen to discuss marketplace
lending, robo-investment services and smart contract derivatives here,
because they illustrate many of the regulatory quandaries raised by advances
in big data analytics, artificial intelligence and smart contracts. However, this
is in no way intended to be an exhaustive list of fintech innovations.
A. Marketplace Lending
In the marketplace lending business model, a borrower requests a loan
using an online platform, and loan applications are assessed using a
combination of big data analytics and machine learning.29 Advances in data
collection and processing technologies allow for a variety of non-traditional
sources to be consulted, including “social media, public records (property
24

Securities and Exchange Commission, About the SEC (available at
https://www.sec.gov/about.shtml).
25
Hilary J. Allen, The SEC as Financial Stability Regulator, 43 J. CORP. L. 715, (2018).
26
12 U.S.C Section 1(a).
27
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, POLICY STATEMENT ON FINANCIAL
TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES’ ELIGIBILITY TO APPLY FOR NATIONAL BANK
CHARTERS, 2 (Jul. 31, 2018) (available at https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/newsreleases/2018/pub-other-occ-policy-statement-fintech.pdf).
28
Id. at 1.
29
John L. Douglas, New Wine Into Old Bottles: Fintech Meets the Bank Regulatory World,
20 N.C. BANK. INST. 17, 27 (2016).
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transactions, births, deaths, marriage, divorce, criminal and civil legal
matters, and the like), GPS and satellite tracking, and cameras.”30 Machine
learning algorithms can be trained to process this voluminous data set
relatively quickly, using rules learned by observing correlations between
equivalent data points and default that exist for other customers.31 If a
prospective borrower meets the algorithmic criteria, then the loan will be
made – initially by a bank, but the bank is soon repaid with funds provided
by investors, whose interest in the loan is ultimately evidenced by a note
issued by the online platform. The platform also processes repayments and
provide administrative services.32
The somewhat convoluted nature of the marketplace lending business
model ensures that many regulators have oversight over at least some part of
the process. The notes issued to the lenders are securities, and so that part of
the process is regulated by the SEC.33 The CFPB oversees the compliance of
the platforms with federal financial consumer protection laws, and accepts
complaints from marketplace lending customers.34 The platforms must also
comply with consumer protection regulations in each state in which they do
business;35 this has generated interest in the OCC’s proposal to grant special
purpose national bank charters to fintech companies that would preempt many
of these state rules.36 Although this so-called “fintech charter” is currently
mired in legal challenges from state authorities, there has been speculation
that large marketplace lending platforms like Prosper and LendingTree would
be the candidates for a fintech charter, if its legality is upheld. Furthermore,
while marketplace loans are typically unsecured and for small amounts,37 we
should not be surprised if, in the future, regulated banks begin to adopt some
of these new credit scoring innovations for mortgages and other larger loans.
If this transpires, the OCC (which oversees national banks) will certainly have
a significant interest in understanding how machine learning assesses
creditworthiness.
30

Jo Ann S. Barefoot, Disrupting FinTech Law, 18 FINTECH LAW REPORT 1, 5 (2015).
Hilary J. Allen, Driverless Finance 10 Harv. B. L. Rev. [101], [113] (2020).
32
For further discussion of the marketplace lending model and applicable regulations, see
Eric C. Chaffee & Geoffrey C. Rapp, Regulating Online Peer-to-Peer Lending in the
Aftermath of Dodd-Frank: In Search of an Evolving Regulatory Regime for an Evolving
Industry, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 485, 493 (2012).
33
Douglas, supra Note 29 at 38.
34
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, CFPB Now Accepting Complaints on Consumer
Loans from Online Marketplace Lender (Mar. 7, 2016) (available at
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-now-accepting-complaints-onconsumer-loans-from-online-marketplace-lender/).
35
Douglas, supra Note 29 at 30-32.
36
OCC, supra Note 27.
37
Marketplace loans are typically under $50,000 for small businesses and around $10,000
for individual consumers. Deloitte, MARKETPLACE LENDING 2.0: BRINGING ON
THE NEXT STAGE IN LENDING, 7 (2017) (available at
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/financial-services/us-fsimarkeplace-lending2.pdf).
31
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Machine learning is a form of artificial intelligence, and can be
distinguished from earlier generations of algorithms on the basis of its ability
to function without precise instructions directing it to achieve a particular
outcome. Instead, machine learning algorithms are “programmed to draw
their own decision-making rules from exposure to voluminous data sets.”38
These algorithms work by detecting patterns and correlations from the data,
but they cannot infer causation.39 As a result, the decisions made by machine
learning algorithms can be unpredictable, and their results may seem
inexplicable to humans.40 Because these algorithms learn probabilistically,
machine learning responses are most likely to diverge from human responses
when assessing low-probability events.41
Machine learning is not central to the issuance of notes by the lending
platforms, and so nothing in the marketplace lending business model seems
to significantly upend the SEC’s application of the securities laws that pertain
to the offering and issuance of notes to investors. However, the consumer
and prudential laws that have traditionally been applied to lending are likely
to struggle with the machine learning aspects of this business model. A loan
approval process based on new data sources and machine learning is vastly
different to the more labor-intensive way that loan applications have been
traditionally processed in the past. While by no means perfect, more
traditional methods of borrower assessment have been honed and tested
through many credit cycles, and regulators are accustomed to supervising
these forms of assessments.42 Machine learning, however, has only been
applied to financial services in the decade since the last financial crisis,43
putting “pressure on regulators to move from regulations designed to control
human behavior to regulation that seeks to supervise automated processes.”44
Furthermore, these machine learning algorithms rely on a wide range of
sources of granular data that will be new for regulators charged with assessing
the quality of a financial institution’s lending practices45 – and most of these
new data have been generated since the recovery from the financial crisis

38

Allen, supra Note 31 at [105-6].
Id. At [120].
40
Andrew Tutt, An FDA for Algorithms 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 83, 87 (2017).
41
Allen, supra Note 31 at [128-9].
42
For a discussion of the banking supervisory process, see Carnell, Macey & Miller, THE
LAW OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (6th Ed.), 344-9 (2017).
43
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES
IN ONLINE MARKETPLACE LENDING, 1 (2016).
44
Dirk A. Zetzsche et al., Regulating a Revolution: From Regulatory Sandboxes to Smart
Regulation, 23 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 31, 93 (2017).
45
Dirk A. Zetzsche et al., The Future of Data-Driven Finance and RegTech, 48 (available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3359399).
39
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began, and so provide little indication of people’s creditworthiness in a
struggling economy.46
Machine learning therefore has the potential to upend supervision and
examination strategies that have been developed over time to assess
traditional loan approval processes, which can serve as an indicia of the
lender’s safety and soundness.47 Mispriced loans can also be problematic
from a consumer protection perspective. While a consumer may initially be
very interested in obtaining a low-interest rate loan, if the credit assessment
algorithm is improperly calibrated, the consumer may ultimately find
themselves unable to repay the loan, which could expose them to default,
collections processes and ultimately bankruptcy.48 The stability of the
financial system as a whole would suffer if a sufficiently large group of
consumers received enough mispriced credit to create a bubble in a particular
asset class, and then that bubble inevitably popped – generating negative
impacts for the balance sheets of banks and other financial institutions49
(those same banks and financial institutions could also be harmed if they
themselves invested heavily in the mispriced loans). Regulators like the OCC
will therefore have to experiment with new ways of assessing data quality (an
issue that will be explored more fully in the next Part). They should also
explore the technology available to allow machine learning algorithms to
contextualize and provide explanations of their decisions,50 and consider
requiring regulated firms that rely on machine learning to use a form of this
technology. Such explanations will better enable the regulators to supervise
a firm’s credit assessment process, and then address common errors with
informal guidance or rules.
Context and explanations may also prove vital to the CFPB in
assessing whether the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (1974) (“ECOA”) has
been breached. This statute prohibits discrimination in the provision of credit
on the basis of an applicant’s race, color, religion, national origin, sex, marital
status, age or participation in public assistance programs,51 and the
prohibition extends to credit scoring policies that have a disparate impact on

46

In 2016, IBM published a report that found that “90 percent of the data in the world today
has been created in the last two years alone.” IBM Marketing Cloud, 10 Key Market Trends
for 2017, 3 (Dec. 2016).
47
“To evaluate a bank’s financial soundness, examiners use the Uniform Financial
Institutions Ratings System, commonly known as the CAMELS system.” Carnell, Macy &
Miller, supra Note 42 at 346. As part of this assessment, “[t]hey scrutinize the bank’s
lending and investment standards, internal controls, and risk-identification and loanadministration practices.” Id. at 248.
48
Leonard J. Kennedy et al., The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Financial
Regulation for the Twenty-First Century, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1144-5 (2012).
49
Id.
50
Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of Explainable Machines, 87
FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1087 (2018).
51
15 USC s 1691(a).
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any one of these classes.52 The CFPB defines a disparate impact as using
“facially neutral policies or practices that have an adverse effect or impact on
a member of a protected class unless it meets a legitimate business need that
cannot reasonably be achieved by means that are less disparate in their
impact.”53 Over the decades, regulators have developed ways of assessing
the disparate impact of facially neutral credit scoring techniques, but different
strategies will be needed to assess whether machine learning algorithms have
engaged (perhaps unwittingly) in discrimination by making decisions on the
basis of proxy variables for protected classes.54 As Prince & Schwarcz
observe, a machine learning algorithm “does not care that the link between
the variable and the desired outcome is actually due to association with a
protected class; it only seeks to find the link. Indeed, because a model’s goal
is to find the best possible predictors though correlation, it will often be
difficult, if not impossible, to determine from the model alone whether proxy
discrimination is occurring.”55 In addition to technologies that allow machine
learning algorithms to provide explanation and context, other technological
solutions may also be useful to the CFPB: Prince & Schwarcz have suggested
the possibility of exposing machine learning algorithms to additional data sets
that will train them to control for membership of a protected class when
making decisions.56
B. Robo-Investment
Robo-advisory firms seek to outcompete traditional financial advisors
by offering investment advice that is claimed to be at least as good as (if not
better than) what a human can provide, at a fraction of the cost.57 While roboadvisory firms can use predictive algorithms to provide automated “customer
profiling, asset allocation, portfolio selection, trade execution, portfolio
rebalancing, tax-loss harvesting and portfolio analysis”,58 there is significant
interest in developing machine learning techniques that can gather
information about a client’s financial situation and improve portfolio
selection.59 Because robo-advisory firms typically provide investment advice
to their clients as well as executing transactions for them, they will usually be
52

Carnell, Macy & Miller, supra Note 42 at 508.
12 CFR Part 1002 Supp. I Sec. 1002.6(a)-2.
54
Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF
L.REV.671, 675 (2016).
55
Anya Prince & Daniel Schwarcz, Proxy Discrimination in the Age of Artificial
Intelligence and Big Data, 65 (available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3347959).
56
Id. at 63.
57
Tom Baker & Benedict Dellaert, Regulating Robo Advice Across the Financial Services
Industry, 103 IOWA L. REV. 713, 719 (2018).
58
FINRA, REPORT ON DIGITAL INVESTMENT ADVICE, 2 (available at
https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/digital-investment-advice-report.pdf).
59
See, for example, Deloitte, THE NEXT FRONTIER: THE FUTURE OF AUTOMATED
FINANCIAL ADVICE IN THE UK, 22 (available at
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/uk/Documents/financial-services/deloitteuk-updated-robo-advice-new-horizons-layout-mww8.pdf).
53
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regulated both by the SEC and by FINRA (a self-regulatory organization that
is overseen by the SEC and focuses on broker-dealer regulation).60
As I have outlined in previous work, the SEC has traditionally not
viewed itself as having a mandate to promote financial stability, and this
stance has perhaps been most controversial in the context of its supervision
of the asset management industry, of which robo-advisors form a part.61 The
potential for the asset management industry to negatively impact the stability
of the financial system will likely be exacerbated by the increasing
prominence of the robo-advisory services that the SEC oversees. Currently,
the approach taken by many robo-advisory firms is to assign all of its investor
clients to one of several buckets, with identical portfolios for everyone
included in the same bucket, which raises the possibility that this business
model will make investment decisions more monolithic, and thus exacerbate
trends towards the asset bubbles and panics that undermine financial
stability.62 New advances in machine learning may ultimately be used to
create more personalized portfolios, moving away from the current industry
standard of putting investors in just a few buckets,63 but if the algorithms in
question are learning from the same data set of historical market information,
then they are nonetheless likely to learn to react in correlated ways.64
Furthermore, because machine learning algorithms learn probabilistically,
there is a real risk that they will consistently underemphasize low-probability
but potentially high-consequence risks in choosing investment of strategies.65
If such a high-consequence tail event were to occur, the ramifications would
be felt extremely quickly in a market characterized by automated portfolio
rebalancing.
Stronger tendencies towards bubble-bust dynamics in the securities
markets could have significant ramifications for the broader economy. I have
therefore argued that “in order to mitigate systemic risk, financial algorithms
capable of machine learning may … need to be exposed to hypothetical
scenarios that emphasize worst-case scenarios, and demonstrate the
consequences of correlated responses to such events.”66 While by no means
a perfect solution, such hypothetical scenarios would at least force machine
learning algorithms to anticipate the possibility of a tail event, and then they
could perhaps be trained in war games to mitigate the systemic repercussions
of their decisions. The creation of hypothetical scenarios and conduct of war
60

Allen, supra Note 31 at [112].
Allen, supra Note 25 at 726.
62
Allen, supra Note 31 at [127].
63
FIN. STABILITY BD., ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND MACHINE LEARNING
IN FINAN- CIAL SERVICES: MARKET DEVELOPMENTS AND FINANCIAL
STABILITY IMPLICATIONS, 30 (2017) (available at http://www.fsb.org/wpcontent/uploads/P011117.pdf).
64
Allen, supra Note 31 at [128].
65
Id. At [129].
66
Id. at [144].
61
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games would be an expensive and laborious process, with parallels to the
creation of the stress testing scenarios currently devised by the Federal
Reserve.67 It is unlikely that the SEC would be eager to take the lead on such
a process, but it could collaborate with the Federal Reserve using the
Financial Stability Oversight Council (of which the SEC and Federal Reserve
Chairs are both members) as a forum for such cooperation.68
The SEC’s more traditional investor protection function will also face
challenges as robo-advisory business models become more prominent. The
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 seeks to protect investors from their
advisers’ conflicts of interest by requiring disclosures from advisers and
prohibiting certain types of transactions:69 while many have argued that such
conflicts are less likely when investment decisions are being made by
machines rather than fallible human beings, it is quite possible that machine
learning algorithms might learn predatory behavior from data sets that
include examples of conflicted transactions.70 As with discrimination in the
provision of credit (discussed in the previous Part), such undesirable behavior
may be harder to detect when it is performed by a facially neutral algorithm.
The SEC’s preferred approach of regulating conflicts through disclosure will
be ineffective in this context unless the algorithm is designed to provide
explanations and context for its decisions.
C. Swaps as Smart Contracts
At the most basic level, a derivative is simply a contract that derives
its value from some kind of financial variable. A swap is a particular type of
derivative contract that involves two counterparties swapping promises to
exchange payments (which are calculated as a percentage of a specified
notional amount).71 The percentage is often derived from some kind of
economic variable, such as an interest rate.72 Perhaps the most notorious type
of swap is the credit default swap (“CDS”), which played a pivotal role in the
last financial crisis. A credit default swap involves one party swapping a
67
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premium (calculated as a percentage of a notional amount) for a promise from
the other party to make a payment if a “credit event” occurs with respect to a
reference debt instrument (depending on the contract, credit events might
include a ratings downgrade, a default, or a bankruptcy).73 The contract itself
is usually based on a form contract promulgated by the International Swaps
and Derivatives Association, and referred to colloquially as an “ISDA”.74
In the lead up to the last financial crisis, AIG alone had issued $1.8
trillion of credit default swaps that insured the holders of mortgage-backed
securities against the occurrence of a credit event.75 AIG did not have
sufficient funds to actually pay all of the holders of those credit default swaps
if a credit event occurred, but it had assumed that the underlying mortgagebacked securities would never default and that it would therefore never be
required to make any payments.76 AIG had grossly underestimated the risks
associated with those mortgage-backed securities, however, and ultimately
required a bailout from the federal government once systemic problems with
mortgage-backed securities became apparent.77 In response to the financial
crisis, Title VII of Dodd-Frank was enacted, which was designed to manage
the risks inherent in swap contracts by requiring most swaps to be cleared
through a regulated central clearinghouse, and by requiring swap
counterparties to post deposits (referred to as margin) with the clearinghouse
to cover any losses.78 The size of the deposit required is adjusted daily
(marked-to-market) to reflect fluctuating risks associated with the underlying
variable for the contract.79 Title VII also requires most swap transactions to
be reported under Dodd-Frank.80 This regulatory regime is primarily
overseen by the CFTC, although the SEC has jurisdiction over security-based
swaps.81
Dodd-Frank was enacted in 2010, before the current wave of fintech
innovation. There is now significant interest in representing swaps as smart
contracts, though,82 so it is important to consider whether Title VII is
equipped to deal with any new problems that smart contracts might create.
“Smart contracts” are computer algorithms that govern the functionality of a
contractual relationship (in this instance, a swap) and that are intended to be
73
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self-executing and self-enforcing.83 Smart contracts are recorded and
transferred on a “distributed ledger”, “an electronic record that is updated in
real-time and intended to be maintained on geographically disperse servers or
nodes.”84 If a credit default swap were memorialized as a smart contract, the
smart contract would automatically calculate and deduct the premium from
one counterparty, and regularly check in with designated external sources
(known as “oracles”) to see if a credit event has occurred that would
automatically initiate a transfer from the other counterparty.85 The CFTC
takes the view that swaps memorialized as smart contracts should be regulated
like any other swap.86 Such an approach certainly has benefits – a credit
default swap memorialized as a smart contract will still pose the risks posed
by credit default swaps memorialized in paper contracts, and so Title VII’s
clearing and margin requirements remain appropriate. However, there are
additional risks raised by smart contracts that are not contemplated by Title
VII (particularly new kinds of operational risks).87
Furthermore, many have expressed skepticism that Title VII’s margin
and collateral requirements are large enough to protect swap counterparties
during a systemic event that affects more than one institution – in such
circumstances, the solvency of the clearinghouses themselves could even be
threatened, with major systemic implications.88 It is quite possible that
extraordinary measures would need to be taken during a future systemic crisis
to prevent catastrophic failures, including the suspension of contractual terms
that relate to the posting of margin.89 Smart contracts – even when working
as intended without any technological glitches or misinformed oracles – could
create new problems in such a context.
To illustrate, we can imagine how the CDS agreements that AIG
entered into with Goldman Sachs and others in the lead up to the last financial
crisis might have performed had they been smart contracts. In July 2007,
Goldman Sachs sought to enforce provisions in its ISDAs with AIG that
authorized Goldman Sachs to determine whether and how much collateral
AIG should post in connection with those ISDAs.90 At the time it had entered
into these ISDAs, AIG had not developed its own models for assessing the
83
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amount of collateral requested by a counterparty – or even really recognized
that a collateral call might be made at all.91 Because AIG failed to negotiate
over the possibility of a collateral call, if this right had been recorded in a
smart contract, Goldman Sachs would simply have had to type the dollar
amount of desired margin into a computer, and the smart contract would have
withdrawn that dollar amount from AIG’s account on the distributed ledger.
This could have been a fatal blow for AIG, as early as the summer of 2007 –
but smart contracts had not yet been developed, which gave AIG an
opportunity to negotiate with Goldman Sachs over the amount of collateral to
be provided. This is what transpired: Goldman Sachs agreed to negotiate, and
they ultimately agreed that AIG could post much less collateral than Goldman
Sachs had initially demanded.92
Of course, AIG had issued so many credit default swaps referencing
ailing mortgage-backed securities that other counterparties were soon
clamoring for collateral,93 and AIG reached the brink of failure in September
2008 as a result of these margin calls.94 AIG’s insolvency was averted by the
federal government, however, in order to prevent the domino effect of
insolvencies that likely would have occurred if AIG had defaulted on all of
its contracts with other financial institutions.95 The federal government
achieved this by pledging to provide AIG with funds to cover the margin
calls.96 If AIG’s CDSs had been automated smart contracts, however, AIG’s
accounts might have been automatically debited for the collateral, rendering
AIG insolvent before government funds could arrive. Unless a smart contract
were programed in advance to delay execution following the announcement
of a government bailout of a counterparty (an unlikely event that would
probably not have been contemplated at the time the smart contract was
formed), the government’s ability to stave off a crisis by announcing relief
would be circumscribed, making financial instability far more likely.
Title VII does nothing to address the new fragilities that are being
introduced into the financial system by using smart contracts to automate (and
therefore speed up and preclude the exercise of human judgment with respect
to) the execution of swap contracts. The CFTC therefore needs to experiment
with new types of regulatory measures that could pause and potentially undo
these transactions when the circumstances warrant. Such measures might
include requiring that all smart contract swaps be programmed to respond to
an oracle maintained by the CFTC that could function as a circuit-breaker,
allowing the CFTC to pause smart contract execution in extraordinary
circumstances.97 In order to detect the extraordinary circumstances that
91
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warrant the use of the circuit-breaker, the CFTC would need to invest in data
analysis tools that would provide it with early warning signals.98 The CFTC
could also consider requiring that all such smart contracts be hosted on a
distributed ledger maintained by identifiable nodes with the power to undo
erroneous transactions when necessary.99 However, no such steps have yet
been taken. The following two Sections will instead survey the regulatory
experimentation that has been conducted to date by financial regulatory
agencies with respect to fintech.
III. EXPERIMENTS WITH REGULATORY SANDBOXES AND OTHER INNOVATORFOCUSED REGULATORY APPROACHES
A. Regulatory Models
Technology entrepreneurs seeking to enter the market for financial
services often find it hard to understand and comply with the regulations that
apply to the financial industry – indeed, even established financial institutions
can find it complicated to understand the regulations that would apply to a
new financial product.100 Jurisdictions seeking to encourage fintech
innovation have therefore adopted a variety of measures to help innovators
navigate the applicable financial regulations. The most prominent of these is
the “regulatory sandbox” designed to allow innovators to conduct a limited
test of fintech products and services in a lenient regulatory environment,101
but there are many other ways in which financial regulators can and do
support fintech innovation. This Section will discuss a sample of the
measures that have been adopted, with a focus on the United States and the
United Kingdom. This is admittedly a very limited sample – sandboxes and
other measures to promote innovation have been prolific in many other
jurisdictions (particularly in Asia)102 – but this Article is focused primarily
on the United States. The United Kingdom is discussed in this Article,
however, because it pioneered the regulatory sandbox concept and as such
has significant precedential value. Also, as a common law jurisdiction with a
vibrant financial sector, the United Kingdom shares many similarities with
the United States – analyzing the United Kingdom’s approach therefore sheds
light on the United States’ situation.
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The United Kingdom’s FCA was the first to implement a fintech
regulatory sandbox in 2016: the FCA describes this sandbox as “a ‘safe space’
in which businesses can test innovative products, services, business models,
and delivery mechanisms while ensuring that consumers are appropriately
protected.”103 Applicants who are selected by the FCA receive six months of
regulatory relief, after which (if the business model is sufficiently successful)
they are expected to transition to the fully regulated environment.104 The
regulatory relief provided takes the form of a restricted authorization, which
the firms can rely upon in order to test their financial products and services
with a limited pool of customers – this alleviates the cost and delay associated
with applying for a full authorization.105 The FCA also provides individual
guidance to sandbox firms as to how it will interpret the application of
existing regulatory requirements (typically developed prior to the smartphone
era) to new technologies.106 Importantly, a restricted authorization still entails
some regulation – sandbox firms must develop policies in conjunction with
the FCA to ensure some protections for the participating consumers.107
The FCA’s sandbox has a very high profile, but it is only one part of
the FCA’s Project Innovate, which was started in 2014.108 Through this
project, the FCA also provides advice and other support to fintech innovators
who are not participating in any sandbox cohort.109 Buckley et al. observe
that far more firms have benefited from this support than have benefitted from
the FCA’s regulatory sandbox.110 Similar support programs for fintech have
also been established in the United States, where they are arguably more
necessary because of the limited opportunities for fintech innovators to
participate in regulatory sandboxes. True sandboxes, offering waivers of
regulatory requirements as well as guidance for innovators, have only been
adopted by the states of Arizona, Utah and Wyoming and by the federal
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,111 and each of these faces significant
limitations that undermine its appeal to innovators seeking to trial their
products and services.
The appeal of the state-based sandboxes is limited by the fact that
these sandboxes only allow innovators to test their products and services with
103
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customers residing in the relevant state.112 There has been some discussion
of “passporting”, which would allow innovators to access consumers in all
states that have established reciprocal sandbox arrangements and thus make
state-administered regulatory sandboxes more useful for innovators, but such
an arrangement would only be valuable if a large number of states adopted
sandboxes with similar passporting arrangements.113 Furthermore, federal
laws will continue to apply to innovators participating in a state-administered
sandbox. The CFPB’s “Compliance Assistance Sandbox”, which was
launched in September of 2019,114 is administered at the federal level and
therefore provides access to a much larger market than state-administered
sandboxes. However, the CFPB only claims the legal authority to preempt
the application of three enumerated federal consumer protection statutes115 –
and even that authority has been questioned by state attorneys-general.116
Given the fragmented nature of financial regulatory authority in the United
States, no regulatory sandbox is likely to give innovators any real certainty
that they will be exempt from regulatory enforcement unless it is coordinated
amongst all of the federal regulators, and designed to preempt all state
regulation.117
In the absence of any compelling regulatory sandbox, many regulators
in the United States have offered other types of support for fintech innovation.
The main differentiating factor between regulatory sandboxes and these other
forms of innovation support seems to be the “signaling” feature that
regulatory sandboxes have, communicating that a jurisdiction is committed to
fostering fintech innovation (although that signal may depreciate in value as
more and more jurisdictions adopt sandboxes).118 These other forms of
regulatory support can nonetheless be very successful in promoting
innovation. For example, many financial regulators have pre-existing powers
to grant waivers and no action letters that can facilitate testing and piloting of
innovative products and services, where appropriate, even in the absence of a
sandbox.119 Regulators have also pursued programs that do not provide any
regulatory relief, but provide guidance to innovators in navigating regulatory
regimes that were often adopted long before the technologies in question were
designed, and as such are often difficult to reconcile. This support typically
takes the form of providing opportunities for innovators to consult with the
112
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regulators – for example, the CFTC’s LabCFTC, FinCEN’s Innovation Hours
and the P2P meetings hosted by the SEC’s FinHub are all designed to allow
for innovators to meet and receive guidance and feedback from regulatory
personnel at an early stage of the innovation. As the CFTC puts it, “[s]uch
feedback may include information that, particularly at an early stage, could
help innovators/entities save time and money by helping them understand
relevant regulations and the CFTC’s approach to oversight.”120
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency has taken a slightly
different approach, offering tailored regulatory regimes coupled with ongoing
guidance in order to encourage innovation. It has proposed an “Innovation
Pilot Program” that is intended to assist regulated banks experimenting with
new technologies to navigate the regulatory requirements that apply to those
technologies.121 It also offers a so-called “Fintech Charter” that is available
to non-banks122 – although recipients of this charter would be subject to
significant regulation by the OCC, it may nonetheless be appealing because
it purports to preempt the application of state laws to the fintech firm.123
However, because neither of these programs offers relief from federal
regulations, they would not typically be considered sandboxes.
Efforts to support fintech innovation at the transnational level have
also begun. The UK’s FCA spearheaded the creation of the Global Financial
Innovation Network in January 2019.124 The CFPB was a founding member
of the GFIN; the CFTC, SEC, FDIC and OCC joined in October of 2019 (the
New York State Department of Financial Services and the Office of the
Arizona Attorney General have also joined). It is not yet clear precisely what
support the GFIN will give to individual innovators, but one of the GFIN’s
stated goals is to “provide accessible regulatory contact information for
firms”, and the GFIN also intends “to provide firms with an environment in
which to trial cross-border solutions.”125 While the FCA had initially
envisaged the GFIN as offering “a full multilateral sandbox that allows
concurrent testing and launch across multiple jurisdictions”, the level of
120
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regulatory coordination necessary for a project has been conceded as too
ambitious for now.126 Even bilateral regulatory coordination on sandbox
trials is likely to involve a significant commitment of regulatory resources.
B. Limitations
These experimental innovator-supporting programs have primarily
been adopted to further the regulatory goals of efficiency, and to promote
competition127 (although some of the policies implementing these programs
also refer to promoting consumer welfare, particularly by broadening access
to and reducing the cost of financial services).128 Efficiency and competition
are important regulatory goals, but they must also be balanced against the
goals of financial stability and investor/consumer protection. Given the farreaching societal costs of financial crises, I and others have argued that
financial stability should be the apex goal of financial regulation.129 The
protection of consumers and investors (in order to ensure that they have
sufficient confidence to participate in a financial system characterized by
information asymmetries) is also a key purpose of financial regulatory
regimes around the world – widespread harm to investors and consumers was
the genesis of the SEC and CFPB respectively.130 Financial stability and
consumer/investor protection are therefore core functions of financial
regulators.
This Essay therefore argues that when designing financial regulatory
experiments, the core goals of financial stability and consumer/investor
protection should not be neglected in favor of innovation-driven efficiency
and competition. In practice, however, these latter goals have been the
preeminent drivers of regulatory experimentation to date. This is likely part
of a larger phenomenon: as Professor Coffee has explained, the attitudes of
regulators and the public towards the necessity of protective financial
regulation tend to move in a “regulatory sine curve”, waxing immediately
following a crisis and waning as time passes and memories fade.131 It is
therefore not particularly surprising that more than a decade after the last
crisis, regulatory focus has shifted towards promoting innovation and
competition, potentially at the expense of consumers, investors and the
126
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stability of the financial system as a whole. The fact that it is unsurprising
does not make it good policy, however.
Most of the methods of innovation support discussed in the previous
Part are very resource intensive, as a result of the one-on-one support
provided to innovators by the regulators (it has been observed that programs
that fail to invest significant regulatory resources are unlikely to be as
successful in promoting innovation).132 Such support can certainly help
innovators bring their products and services to market, but if the innovation
process primarily benefits the innovator and does not generate broader
benefits for society, then it is not good public policy to dedicate scarce public
resources to facilitating the innovation process.133 Ideally, such support will
result in innovations that are both profitable and beneficial for
consumers/investors (particularly previously underserved markets) by
providing financial services more cheaply and efficiently.134 However, if
“financial inclusion” turns out to be a euphemism for unscrupulous fintech
providers preying upon unsophisticated consumers and investors, then it will
be particularly important for financial regulators to continue to exercise their
more traditional consumer/investor protection functions. Furthermore, it is
unrealistic to expect private sector innovation to further the regulatory goal of
financial stability, except inadvertently (private sector innovators almost
always lack the incentives – not to mention the ability to coordinate their
competitors – necessary to promote the stability of the financial system as a
whole).135 Regulatory sandboxes could prove to be a particularly problematic
form of regulatory experimentation if they dispense with regulations that are
designed to protect consumers, investors or financial stability – in such
circumstances, they could operate as a form of deregulation that results in real
harm.
Unfortunately, the limitations of innovator-supporting regulatory
programs often receive less attention than they deserve, perhaps because of
an unwarranted presumption that innovation is inherently good.136 That
presumption should not be left unexamined, however. Supporting fintech
innovation should not result in financial regulators neglecting their core
objectives of consumer/investor protection and financial stability.
Experimentation with investor-supporting regulatory programs can
incidentally benefit these regulatory goals, by allowing regulators to influence
the development of new innovations, and to learn about nascent technologies
(as such, these programs should be assessed by reference to the level of
132

Buckley et al., supra Note 102 at 6.
Allen, supra Note 100 at 606.
134
FCA, REGULATORY SANDBOXES LESSONS LEARNED REPORT, 9 (Oct. 2017)
(available at https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/research-and-data/regulatory-sandboxlessons-learned-report.pdf).
135
Allen, supra Note 11 at 1103.
136
For a critique of this assumption, see Allen, supra Note 100 at 605 et seq.
133

22

Hilary J. Allen

collaboration, influence and information-sharing involved).137 However, the
regulatory experiments discussed in the previous Part were not designed for
the primary purpose of helping financial regulators to execute their core
regulatory goals in a system that is being rapidly change by new technologies.
Furthermore, all of the regulatory experiments discussed in the previous Part
require an affirmative decision by a private firm to participate. They do not
provide any tools for financial regulators to pursue their core mandates of
consumer/investor protection and financial stability against firms that do not
opt in to collaborating with the regulator. The next Section will therefore
explore other types of experimentation that regulators should consider
engaging in – experimentation that uses technology in an attempt to address
the problems for investors, consumers and financial stability raised by
fintech’s new processes for delivering financial products and services,
irrespective of whether a fintech firm has chosen to work with the regulator.
IV. EXPERIMENTATION WITH SUPTECH
A. The State of Regulatory Innovation
The previous Section demonstrated that the most high-profile
experimentation with fintech regulatory strategies has been outward facing,
designed to support private-sector innovators. In the last year, however,
regulators around the world have increased their own experimentation behind
the scenes, exploring the use of technologies to address their own core
mandates.138 This Essay uses the term “SupTech” to refer to innovation by
financial regulators that is informed by technological advances in big data
analytics, machine learning and distributed ledger technology.139 Readers
may be more familiar with the term “RegTech”, but this Essay prefers
“SupTech” because of the confusion inherent in the former term. “RegTech”
is used to describe technologies that are used by industry participants to
facilitate their own regulatory compliance, as well as innovations that are used
by the regulators themselves to improve their regulatory functions.140 This
Essay focuses primarily on the latter, and so the narrower term “SupTech”
provides more precision.141
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While few SupTech applications are operational yet,142 regulators
around the world are becoming increasingly interested in trialing or
developing such applications, with the Financial Stability Institute of the
Bank for International Settlements reporting in October 2019 that
approximately twenty financial regulatory bodies were engaging in some type
of SupTech experimentation.143 To date, SupTech has focused primarily on
improving the collection and analysis of voluminous amounts of data relating
to reporting requirements, fraud detection and AML compliance.144 The
focus on reporting requirements makes sense in light of the increased volume
of data that must be disclosed post-Crisis145 and the private sector’s increasing
use of RegTech solutions to automate their compliance with those
regulations146 (as Baxter has noted, “[m]anual surveillance of automated
activities . . . is entirely unrealistic, and the automation of many of the
regulatory tasks traditionally performed manually seems imperative”).147
Regulators are also realizing that SupTech has the potential to be more than a
defensive necessity; market surveillance for fraud and money-laundering may
increasingly allow for real-time detection and intervention,148 and the hope is
that “risk and compliance monitoring [will turn] from a backward-looking
into a predictive and proactive process.”149
Looking more specifically at the US financial regulators discussed in
this Essay, there is little information available (at least publicly) regarding
any SupTech experimentation by the CFPB or OCC,150 while the SEC and
CFTC have engaged in more highly publicized experimentation. The SEC
has focused its attentions on XBRL (machine readable data) reporting
requirements, the MIDAS system to analyze big data generated by the equity
markets, the ARTEMIS big data enforcement tool and the Consolidated Audit
Trail for tracking and recording trading activity across the securities
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exchanges.151 These programs are primarily focused on improving disclosure
and surveillance processes, and the CFTC has similarly emphasized
disclosure and surveillance in its “CFTC 2.0” initiative, noting that:
New technologies hold the promise to change the way the CFTC
fulfills its mission. For example, FinTech innovation could reshape
the way the CFTC conducts market oversight to enhance market and
risk surveillance vital to market integrity. FinTech innovation may
also provide new ways for the CFTC to gather and disseminate market
data to improve transparency. Through CFTC 2.0, CFTC staff can
explore promising ideas and have the opportunity to develop greater
in-house capability and knowledge.152
Experimentation with these types of SupTech are laudable. However,
such experimentation has thus far sought to streamline existing regulatory
functions. This Essay (particularly Section II) has made the case that new
regulatory functions are needed to respond to the qualitative changes that
fintech is making to the processes by which financial services are being
delivered. This type of SupTech experimentation is sorely lacking.
Furthermore, there has only been very limited exploration of using SupTech
to improve the performance of existing prudential regulatory functions,153
which will become crucial as private firms increasingly use machine learning
algorithms for risk management.154 Yang has observed that “[s]ome financial
regulators have applied Al in model validation to detect anomalous
projections generated by its models of stress tests, while others have applied
it to model the capital market business for bank stress testings”,155 and the
Bank of Italy is using machine learning to “analyse real estate ads in a popular
online portal to forecast housing prices and inflation.”156 Overall, however,
the BIS has found that very few financial regulators are dedicating their
SupTech resources to prudential oversight responsibilities157 –
notwithstanding the potential for aggregating new data sources and machine
learning analysis techniques to detect threats to individual institutions and the
financial system as whole.158 More experimentation with SupTech is
therefore necessary, although such experimentation raises a host of challenges
that are discussed in the next Section.
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B. Challenges for SupTech Innovation
U.S. financial regulators have been comparatively slow to experiment
with innovator-supporting regulatory approaches to fintech, so it would not
be particularly surprising if they were not early movers in experimenting with
SupTech either. However, while caution is justified when considering
regulatory sandboxes and other innovator-supporting approaches (because of
the resource-intensive nature of such policies and uncertainties about their
ability to further core regulatory goals),159 experimentation with SupTech
should be pursued as a matter of priority. The application of machine learning
and smart contracts to financial services is only just beginning, and so there
is still significant scope for regulators to require that SupTech technologies
be incorporated into privately-developed financial products.160 Inserting
SupTech technologies into operational technologies will be far more difficult,
and more likely to result in unexpected (and potentially negative) side
effects.161 Time is therefore of the essence in SupTech experimentation –
unfortunately, SupTech experimentation is very resource intensive, and faces
other challenges as well. This Part will consider these challenges.
Many of the problems highlighted in Section II regarding the
difficulty of regulating innovation generally pertain to the development of
SupTech tools. Limited resources and expertise are an unavoidable
constraint. Also, some form of regulatory arbitrage is inevitable, and
regulators must be careful to balance their commitments to preserving
financial stability and protecting consumers/investors with any mandates to
promote competition and market efficiency (the latter of which are often
facilitated by new innovation). The enormity of these challenges may help
explain regulators’ limited embrace of SupTech so far. The BIS has made
similar observations with regards to regulators’ hesitancy to experiment with
SupTech, noting “(i) concerns among financial authorities about the uncertain
value and risks of suptech [particularly operational risks]; (ii) resource
constraints; and (iii) a limited product offering for suptech solutions from a
small pool of specialised technology vendors. The inertia inherent in legacy
IT systems is another factor.” 162
The most obvious and pressing concern is a lack of resources and
expertise. If technology is to be harnessed to achieve the regulatory goals of
consumer/investor protection and financial stability, regulators will either
have to develop that technology in-house, or enlist someone to develop it for
them. The approach chosen will depend in large part upon the resources
available internally – often, regulators will lack the necessary personnel and
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expertise for in-house development.163 However, regulators can only
outsource if there is someone they can outsource to, and there are few vendors
specializing in SupTech tools.164 If regulators can find a suitable third party
vendor, the efficacy of the technology they receive from that vendor will be
necessarily constrained by their budget, and by the ability of regulators to
monitor the vendor.165 Input into the process of technological development
is vital to shaping it, and so ongoing dialogue between the regulator and the
vendor is vital to ensuring that the technology will properly execute
regulatory priorities.166 In order to be able to achieve this, regulators need
personnel who are able to communicate with the technical specialists at the
vendor. As such, if regulators do not have the resources necessary to execute
SupTech solutions in-house, they at least need to prioritize hiring or
cultivating ‘interpreters’, who have one foot in the regulatory world and one
foot in the technical world. These interpreters may not be as technologically
sophisticated as the people actually creating the SupTech solutions, but they
should be able to communicate at a sufficient level that they can relay the
regulator’s demands, and check at all intermediate steps that the technical
solutions are responsive to those demands. Unfortunately for the regulatory
agencies, such a skill set will be very valuable, and they may have difficulty
retaining these ‘interpreters’.167
Retention efforts must be made, however, because interpreters will
remain vital after the initial solution has been built. Regulators must remain
humble about their technological solutions, and admit when they have failed
or require substantial revision – otherwise, the product will entrench and
institutionalize flawed regulatory approaches.168 The interpreters will be
needed to determine if the technology is performing as needed, and the
technology should be designed in a way that is sufficiently transparent to
allow interpreters to either make any necessary changes themselves, or at least
detect the parts of the system that require revision and contract technological
experts to make the necessary changes.169 SupTech solutions are therefore
not costless to maintain, although they may increase efficiency and thus
conserve resources that would otherwise need to be devoted to supervision.170
Luca Enriques has noted that where regulators have limited funds
available to pay vendors for SupTech solutions, the same vendors may wish
163
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to leverage their work by providing related compliance solutions to private
firms who can pay more – this may result in a very sophisticated form of
regulatory arbitrage where the vendors skew the SupTech software in favor
of their more lucrative private clients.171 One possible way to avoid such an
outcome is for regulators to partner with quasi-public sector entities with
significant research capacity, such as universities with strong data science or
software engineering departments172 – this may be the most fruitful approach
for developing the cutting edge regulatory tools advocated for in this Essay.173
Even when arbitrage is not baked into the SupTech technology itself, other
forms of regulatory arbitrage are also possible – through interviews with
financial regulators around the world, the BIS found that “a few supervisory
agencies recognize the risk that their use of suptech might lead to market
participants adjusting their behavior in order to “game” the technology.”174
Regulatory bodies adopting SupTech solutions must therefore remain
alert to forms of arbitrage, and they must also devote more resources to
managing their own internal operational risks.175 Technology-driven
regulatory tools may become a target for cyberattacks, and the more complex
they are, the more susceptible they are to unanticipated glitches that can
cascade and compound as they move through the regulatory apparatus.176
Such operational failures may not be confined within the agency – they may
ultimately cause problems for regulated entities as well, particularly if
RegTech and SupTech software are designed to be interoperable.177 Such a
possibility creates reputational and legal risks for regulatory agencies that
must also be managed. Ultimately, some SupTech failures should be
expected (particularly when new technologies are being layered over legacy
technology systems); trial and error will be necessary.178 While fear of the
fallout from the errors might understandably deter regulators from embracing
SupTech solutions, waiting too long to address the new fintech processes
being adopted by the private sector is ill-advised for both political economy
and technological reasons. Regulators often find it difficult to upset market
expectations about the regulatory treatment of an established product or
service,179 and it is also much easier to shape a technology (for example, by
inserting a circuit breaker into a smart contract) during its development than
171
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it is to alter an operational technology – and the latter is much more likely to
result in unanticipated negative consequences.180
Even when financial regulators accept that proactively engaging in
SupTech innovation is in their long-term best interests, it can be challenging
to identify and prioritize opportunities for SupTech applications. Some
regulatory agencies are directing their researchers to develop technological
responses to questions posed by policymakers and academics; at other
agencies, the regulators themselves are identifying technologies that would
assist them in discharging their functions.181 In either instance, the
technological solutions adopted may have to straddle a number of different
regulatory objectives. In some situations, there may not be any cause for
conflict – the financial industry, regulatory agencies and financial intelligence
units like FinCEN tend to be aligned in seeking more efficient ways to
investigate and prevent financial crime (this win-win mentality is perhaps part
of the explanation while so much SupTech innovation has occurred in the
field of AML/KYC technology, including biometrics and big data
analytics).182 More efficient and targeted approaches to reporting and fraud
detection could also be considered a win-win, but some SupTech solutions
may have negative consequences for other financial regulatory mandates.
For example, algorithms work more quickly with fewer lines of code,
and so adding technological requirements like circuit breakers to smart
contracts could make the product marginally less efficient. It may also be
hard to determine upfront whether a SupTech innovation will have
unintended consequences that could ultimately undermine a regulatory goal.
For example, if multiple machine learning algorithms are trained with the
same regulator-developed hypothetical scenarios in order to expose them to
the possibility of tail events, then the result may be greater correlation in the
behavior of the algorithms – which could ultimately create financial
instability.183 In developing such scenarios, regulators should therefore make
try to anticipate the reflexivity of algorithmic interactions,184 but it is still
possible that regulatory efforts could create what Whitehead has termed
“destructive correlation.”185 The possibility of such an outcome will be
heightened if there is international regulatory collaboration on developing
SupTech tools – and such collaboration is to be expected, because it can help
scale many of the other benefits of SupTech.186
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Regulators therefore need to constantly interrogate their SupTech
innovations in light of their broader understanding of the financial system and
their regulatory goals.187 This can be challenging even for experienced
regulators – it can be tempting to simply defer to a technological solution
without interrogating its underlying process (a heuristic known as
“automation bias”).188 Indeed, many tech tools seem designed to encourage
automation bias, offering “intuitive, user-friendly interfaces with advanced
graphics and interactive tools, which empower end users with non-technology
backgrounds … to tap into the benefits of these advanced technologies.”189
However, automation is not a neutral process, but a reflection of the policy
views of the regulators implementing the solution, perhaps tempered by the
beliefs and understandings of the third-party vendor actually constructing the
solution.190 Regulators must therefore maintain some degree of skepticism
and humility regarding their SupTech solutions. For more junior personnel
who join regulatory agencies in the era of SupTech, it will be even more
important that they be trained in developing nuanced regulatory expertise and
temper their use of SupTech with human judgment.191 Otherwise, the skillsets
of regulatory expertise and judgment may be lost as regulators increasingly
defer to technological solutions.192
V. CONCLUSION
SupTech is not a panacea, and we should remain mindful of Haldane
and Madouros’ admonition that it can be counterproductive for regulators to
meet industry complexity with regulatory complexity.193 However, when the
industry is using complex technologies like smart contracts and machine
learning, it is difficult to see how regulators can develop simple strategies for
engaging with them – other than banning them, or requiring a preapproval
process that would significantly slow their development. As I have
previously argued, a preapproval process for new financial technologies
would have many benefits, but seems politically infeasible at present (as well
as ripe for jurisdictional arbitrage).194 And bans, although they may be
warranted in some circumstances, are an extreme response that could restrict
the development of products and services that might ultimately benefit
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individual consumers and investors.195 Financial regulators therefore need to
experiment with technological responses to the technologies they regulate,
and they need to do so as a matter of priority. Experimentation will take time,
and if regulators miss their window, the financial system will be shaped
entirely by the experimentation of a private sector with little motivation to
protect consumers, investors, or the stability of the financial system.
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